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Case note 
 
VOID CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF CHOICE OF LAW 
CLAUSES TO CONSEQUENTIAL RESTITUTIONARY CLAIMS 
 
CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 543 
 
This note examines the Singapore Court of Appeal’s judgment in CIMB Bank Bhd 
v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 543, focusing specifically on what role, if 
any, should be played by a choice of law clause contained in a void contract in 
relation to the restitutionary aftermath of voidness.1 
 
Adeline CHONG 
LL.B (Birmingham), Ph.D (Nottingham) 
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University 
 
I. Introduction  
 
1 In CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd, 2 the Singapore Court of Appeal 
had the opportunity to investigate what role should be played by a choice of law clause 
contained in a contract which is conceded to be void in relation to the restitutionary 
aftermath of the voidness. This issue will form the focal point of this note. 
 
2 The case arose out of the sale of promissory notes by CIMB to Dresdner for 
approximately US$8.2m. The sale had been arranged, on CIMB’s part, by one of its 
employees at its Inanam branch, George Chau. The contract between CIMB and Dresdner 
contained an English choice of law clause. It later transpired that the promissory notes 
had been issued in relation to a non-existent project, the whole thing being a fraud 
perpetrated by George Chau. Dresdner instituted an action for return of the US$8.2m on 
the basis of unjust enrichment. CIMB then applied to have the action stayed on the basis 
of forum non conveniens, arguing that England was the more appropriate forum.3 In the 
course of applying the Spiliada test4 on whether Singapore or some other forum was the 
more appropriate forum, the Court of Appeal had to consider what was the applicable law 
of the unjust enrichment claim, this being a factor indicating where the centre of gravity 
of the case lies.  
 
3 The court was clear that one had to draw a distinction between a case where the 
parties agree that there is no agreement at all, such as in the present action, and a case 
where the parties disagree as to whether there is an agreement between them. In the latter 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Prof Yeo Tiong Min for suggesting I look at this case in the first place and also his 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. All errors remain my own. 
2 [2008] 4 SLR 543. 
3 Dresdner instituted the Singaporean proceedings to make sure it was within the limitation period; it then 
promptly applied for a temporary stay whilst it awaited the outcome of German proceedings that had been 
brought against it by the ultimate purchasers of the dishonoured promissory notes. CIMB, on the other hand, 
requested a permanent stay of the Singaporean action. 
4 Test derived from Spiliada Martime Corp v Cansulex [1987] AC 460.  
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situation, the court advocated the putative applicable law approach ie application of the 
law that would govern the contract if it were valid to determine if the contract is valid. 
Although this is the generally adopted solution for the classic conflicts conundrum of 
which law determines if a contract is void,5 there is room for a subtler approach to this 
issue.6 However, given that Dresdner gave an undertaking that for the purposes of this 
action, it would not maintain that the agreement was valid, the opportunity to investigate 
alternative approaches did not arise. Instead, the central issue that the court faced was 
whether a choice of law clause contained in an admitted void contract could provide the 
applicable law of the unjust enrichment claim. 
 
4 Before going into the specifics of the judgment, it must be pointed out that 
Dresdner’s concession that there was no “agreement” is to be equated with a concession 
that there was no valid contract between the parties. The importance of this point will be 
apparent later. 
 
II. The judgment 
 
5 In order to determine what was the applicable law of the unjust enrichment claim, 
the court had to first determine what is the choice of law rule for unjust enrichment. Here, 
the court applied Rule 230 of Dicey, Morris and Collins which sets out that : 
 
(1) The obligation to restore the benefit of an enrichment obtained at another 
person’s expense is governed by the proper law of the obligation. 
(2) The proper law of the obligation is (semble) determined as follows : 
(a) If the obligation arises in connection with a contract, its proper law is 
the law applicable to the contract; 
(b) If it arises in connection with a transaction concerning an immovable 
(land), its proper law is the law of the country where the immovable is 
situated (lex situs); 
(c) If it arises in any other circumstances, its proper law is the law of the 
country where the enrichment occurs. 
 
6 It was common ground that sub-rule 2(b) was inapplicable given that the 
transaction did not involve any land. The issue was whether sub-rule 2(a) or sub-rule 2(c) 
provided the applicable law. CIMB argued that sub-rule 2(a) applied and pointed towards 
English law because of the English choice of law clause, whereas Dresdner relied on sub-
rule 2(c) to maintain that Singapore law, being the law of the place of enrichment as 
Dresdner had remitted the money to CIMB Singapore, provided the proper law of the 
restitutionary obligation. 
 
                                                 
5 Eg Article 10(1) of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I); Albeko Schumaschinen v The 
Kamborian Shoe Machine Co (1961) 111 LJ 519.  
6 See eg, Adrian Briggs, ‘The Formation of International Contracts’ [1990] LMCLQ 192; Jonathan Harris, 
‘Does Choice of Law Make Any Sense?’ (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 305 at 316-324; Adeline 
Chong, ‘Choice of Law for Void Contracts and Their Restitutionary Aftermath : The Putative Governing 
Law of the Contract’ in Re-examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment (Paula Giliker ed) (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2007) at pp 155-170. 
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7 CIMB’s argument that the English choice of law clause in the void contract 
should be given effect to govern the restitutionary consequences was thought by the court 
to be somewhat mischievous given that CIMB had asserted that George Chau did not 
have the authority to enter into the agreement on its behalf and hence CIMB did not 
intend to enter into any contract. CIMB argued however that on Dresdner’s part, there 
was such an intention. The court observed : “[T]he entire situation smacked of CIMB 
wanting to have its cake and eat it too.”7 
 
8 Central to the court’s reasoning was the assessment of whether there had been a 
“meeting of minds” between the parties. So, if the parties had intended to enter into a 
contract, but some factor renders the contract ineffective or a failure, a choice of law 
clause contained in the ineffective or failed contract should be given effect to govern the 
consequential restitutionary obligation.8 If there was no “meeting of minds” to enter into 
the contract at all and in effect there was no contract, then the choice of law clause has no 
further application.9 
 
9 Furthermore, the court held that one needed to examine whether the factor which 
rendered the contract void also rendered the choice of law clause void.10 The court noted 
that the defence of non est factum would strike down all the terms of a contract including 
any express choice of law clause, whereas vitiating factors such as fraud, duress or 
common mistake as to the subject matter of the contract needed to be scrutinized further 
to see if they directly impugned any express choice of law clause. If the clause is not 
impugned, then there are grounds for contending that the law stipulated in the clause 
should govern the restitutionary consequences. 
 
10 Applying these principles to the present case, the court held that there was no 
“meeting of minds” between the parties since it was common ground that there was no 
contract. Alternatively, the fraud perpetrated by George Chau infected the entire 
“agreement”.11 Thus, the English choice of law clause did not bind the parties. Sub-rule 
2(a) was inapplicable and the present action instead fell within sub-rule 2(c). Given that 
Dresdner had transferred the money to CIMB Singapore and Singapore was also the 
place where CIMB allegedly changed its position by remitting the money to HSBC Hong 
Kong, 12  the court had no hesitation in holding that Singapore was the place of 
                                                 
7 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [43]. Yet there is more merit to CIMB’s argument than the court gave credit for, 
although it is suggested that CIMB did not quite make the correct argument; see Part III of the main text 
below. 
8 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [41]. 
9 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [50]. 
10 In relation to this, the court referred to the “infection” test propounded by Harris (supra n 6) ie one has to 
examine if the factor rendering the contract invalid “infects” the choice of law clause too. 
11 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [54]. 
12 CIMB Singapore transferred the money over to HSBC Hong Kong in favour of an unrelated third party 
company seemingly pursuant to fraudulent instructions issued by George Chau and another employee of 
CIMB. 
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enrichment.13  Hence Singapore law was the applicable law of the unjust enrichment 
claim.14  
 
11 Upon considering other additional factors, such as the possibility of related third 
party actions by CIMB and the availability of relevant witnesses, the court concluded that 
it was not established that England was the more appropriate forum for trial of the action. 
Accordingly, CIMB’s application for a stay of the Singaporean proceedings was denied. 
 
III. Analysis 
 
12 The court’s exposition of the principles as to when an express choice of law 
clause could be said to survive contractual invalidity was careful and precise. The 
recognition that the important factor was whether there was a “meeting of minds” 
between the parties and needing to assess whether the grounds of the contractual failure 
directly impugned the choice of law clause demonstrated a clarity of judicial reasoning in 
this fraught area that should be applauded. 
 
13 That said, it may be questioned whether the court accurately applied those 
principles to the case at hand. The court stressed several times that they were not dealing 
with a situation where there was a contract which the parties intended to enter into but 
which subsequently failed but rather a situation where both parties acknowledged that 
there was no “agreement”. This, to the court’s mind, meant that there was no “meeting of 
minds” and therefore the English choice of law clause did not bind both parties.15 
 
14 With respect, the conclusion that Dresdner’s concession that there was no contract 
between Dresdner and CIMB meant that there was no “meeting of minds” between the 
two parties was not an irresistible one. Even when Dresdner was informed by CIMB 
London that George Chau did not have the authority to enter into that particular 
transaction, Dresdner persisted in remitting the US$8.2 m to CIMB Singapore.16 Upon 
payment, CIMB London, despite all their earlier warnings to Dresdner about George 
Chau’s lack of authority to enter into the transaction on their behalf, passed the 
promissory notes to Dresdner. It is untenable that either party did these actions on a whim. 
Dresdner’s actions in remitting the money and CIMB’s actions in handing the promissory 
notes over can be traced back to the void contract containing the English choice of law 
clause.  
 
15 The point being made here is that the “agreement” was executed by both sides. 
Objectively construed, there is a strong argument that although there may have been no 
valid binding contract between the two parties, there was an “agreement” ie there was a 
                                                 
13 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [60].  
14 Rather interestingly, the court noted ultimately that even if they had concluded that the applicable law of 
the unjust enrichment claim was English, rather than Singaporean law, this would not have been a factor of 
much significance when applying the forum non conveniens test as the Singapore law on unjust enrichment 
was said to be similar, if not identical, to the English law on unjust enrichment. See [2008] 4 SLR 543 at 
[63]. 
15 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [56]. 
16 This was probably because of an oversight on Dresdner’s part; see [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [28].  
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“meeting of minds” between Dresdner and CIMB that was sufficient at least to compel 
the parties’ actions. Therefore, the English choice of law clause should have been held to 
survive the acknowledgement that there was no contract and held to be the applicable law 
of the unjust enrichment claim.17 
 
16 The alternative reason used ie that the vitiating factor was the fraud perpetrated by 
George Chau against both Dresdner and CIMB and this fraud “infected” the entire 
contract, including the English choice of law clause,18 could also have merited further 
probing. Fraud, whether under English or Singaporean domestic contract law,19 merely 
renders a contract voidable, not void. If fraud were the vitiating factor, then there is 
actually a contract which did exist, but is now treated as if it never did exist upon 
avoidance.20 Given that there was a contract prior to the moment of avoidance, this brings 
one back full circle to the point that there initially was a “meeting of minds” between the 
parties. In addition, the court should have, in accordance with the principles it had so 
clearly articulated, assessed independently whether the fraud directly impugned the 
choice of law clause itself.21 
 
IV. Further points  
 
17 The court’s judgment raises certain issues associated with the survivability of 
choice of law clauses contained in void contracts that may benefit from some further 
exploration. 
 
A. Meeting of minds  
 
18 Notwithstanding its judgment on the facts of the case, it is unlikely that the court 
meant that only a valid contract would indicate that there has been a meeting of minds 
between the parties. The court had noted that the presence of vitiating factors such as 
fraud, duress or common mistake as to the subject matter of the contract would not 
necessarily mean that the parties did not have the intention to enter into a contract.22 
Therefore, although the court did not elaborate on what “meeting of minds” means, it is 
probably fair conjecture that the court meant stripping down a bargain to its bare 
essentials. In relation to this, most, if not all, legal systems would accept that there is a 
“meeting of minds” when there is an offer and a matching acceptance. Other elements, 
such as the common law requirement of consideration, is submitted to be extraneous to 
the enquiry as to whether there has been a “meeting of minds”.  
 
                                                 
17 Sub-rule 2(a) covers claims arising from a void contract : Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of 
Laws (Lawrence Collins gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2006) at para 34-020. 
18 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [54]. 
19 If one ignores the English choice of law clause, the objective proper law of the contract is probably either 
English or Singaporean law. 
20 Paraphrasing Yeo Tiong Min, Choice of Law for Equitable Doctrines (OUP, 2004) at para 9.22. 
21 As the court noted, it would be “rare” for the fraud to have directly impacted on the victim’s decision to 
agree to the choice of law clause itself : [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [46]. 
22 See especially [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [46]-[47]. 
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19 In most instances, the question of whether the parties minds have met would be a 
purely factual one. However, sometimes questions of law may arise. Issues such as 
whether silence constitutes acceptance, whether the defence of non est factum is made out, 
or whether a postal acceptance which goes awry constitutes valid acceptance all involve 
questions of law. This then leads to the query : which law should determine whether there 
has been a “meeting of minds”? 
 
20 As mentioned earlier, when the parties are in dispute as to whether a contract 
exists between them, the generally accepted approach is application of the putative 
governing law of the contract. This was approved by the court who noted that : “Such a 
rule makes good practical sense because otherwise it would mean that a mere allegation 
on the part of the defendant that there was fraud would suffice to neutralise the effect of 
the … choice of law clause in the agreement.”23 This argument works the other way 
round too. If an illiterate man concludes a contract thinking that he is signing a tenancy 
agreement when he is signing a contract of sale, it would be unfair on him to give effect 
to a choice of law clause cannily inserted into the contract by the other party for 
Ruritanian law, under which there is no defence of non est factum. There is a strong case 
for a more principled basis upon which to determine whether a contract is void rather 
than just simply applying the law stipulated in a choice of law clause in a disputed 
contract.24 Similarly, it is submitted that the putative governing law of the contract should 
not govern the question of whether there has been a “meeting of minds” between the 
parties when one is determining whether an express choice of law clause in a void 
contract should be applied to the restitutionary consequences of voidness. 
 
21 It is suggested that the law which is best suited to determine this issue is the lex 
fori. Admittedly, use of the lex fori has its own drawbacks – on the one hand, it can be 
considered to be parochial and may have little connection with the facts. On the other 
hand, if the parties have chosen to sue and submit in the forum, the parties agree to be 
subjected to the forum’s choice of law rules. They then have little cause to complain if 
the choice of law rules of the lex fori dictates that the preliminary issue of whether the 
parties have had a “meeting of minds” is to be assessed by a stripped down version of the 
lex fori’s domestic contract law. Alternatively, if the court has exercised long arm 
jurisdiction on the basis of Order 11 of the Rules of Court,25 some sort of connection with 
Singapore is insisted upon so there is justification for applying Singaporean rules on 
whether there has been a “meeting of minds” between the parties. One should also note 
that Singaporean law is not advocated to be the law which would apply to the substance 
of the restitutionary claim; it merely plays a preliminary role in determining what should 
be the applicable law of the restitutionary claim. Thus, if Singaporean domestic contract 
law rules on offer and acceptance finds that there has been consensus between the parties, 
then any express choice of law clause in the void contract can be given effect and it is 
that law which will go on to govern the restitutionary claim. Applying this on the facts of 
Dresdner, it has been argued that a matching offer and acceptance can be derived from an 
objective overview of the parties’ actions. 
                                                 
23 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [30]. 
24 See supra n 6. 
25 Cap 322, R 5. 
  7 
 
B. Illogicality 
 
22 The second issue that crops up is this : if the contract is void, how can it have a 
governing law and how can that governing law be applied to the restitutionary 
consequences of voidness? One could possibly justify use of the putative governing law 
of the contract to determine whether the contract is valid but when the voidness of the 
contract has already been established, it is sheer illogicality still to call upon this law.  
 
23 There are nevertheless strong pragmatic reasons to justify applying the putative 
governing law of a contract to the restitutionary consequences. First, party expectations 
would probably be that any law which they choose to govern their contract would not 
only govern disputes arising out of the contract but also any consequences arising from 
the failure of the contract. It is unlikely that the parties intended one law to govern any 
contractual disputes and a different law to govern non-contractual disputes between them 
if those disputes arose out of the same transaction. Secondly, application of the putative 
governing law to the consequences of voidness will lead to a certain symmetry26 because 
that same law would have determined the contract’s voidness. This symmetry serves 
several functions. In addition to the advantages of practicality and convenience, the risk 
of inconsistency can be side-stepped. For example, the contract may be held to be void by 
the putative governing law of the contract, the law of country A, but the law of country B 
is instead applied to the restitutionary consequences. It might be though that according to 
the law of country B, the contract is valid and not void.  
 
24 Thus, as the court explained :  
 
One answer [to the criticism of illogicality] is that perhaps it is convenient 
and pragmatic to adopt that rule and, arguably, such an approach was 
probably in line with the expectations of the parties. This approach seems 
to be premised on the assumption that the choice of law clause can be 
regarded as separable from the contract itself. If the law applicable to a 
contract determines that it is void, it is not obviously desirable, or 
commercially sensible, for a different law then to be applied to determine 
the restitutionary consequences of this voidness.27 
 
25 Two further justifications can be added to what has been set out above. One is that 
any lingering problems of whether certain claims are contractual or restitutionary28 would 
not pose a hurdle at the conflicts stage as the same law would be applicable no matter 
                                                 
26 That said, it is not suggested that the law which strikes down a contract should invariably be applied to 
the consequences of voidness. Eg, if the contract is void because it is against forum public policy, the 
applicable law of the unjust enrichment claim is still suggested to be the putative governing law of the 
contract. The lex fori merely plays the normal subsidiary role of stepping in only if the effect of applying 
the foreign governing law of the contract to the restitutionary aftermath offends forum public policy. See 
Chong, supra n 6 at pp 176-181.  
27 [2008] 4 SLR 543 at [33]. 
28 Eg, the question mark over rescission; see Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Butterworths, 2nd 
Ed, 2002) at pp 56-60.  
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how the characterization exercise is carried out. Another, and crucial, point is that the 
putative governing law of the contract will, more often than not, be the law of closest 
connection to the unjust enrichment claim. As Lord Penrose has observed : 
 
… at the very least the attempt of parties to make a contract governed by 
or putatively governed by a chosen system of law or by a system selected 
on conventional conflict principles, remains a reality irrespective of 
whether or not they succeed in that attempt, and in particular remained a 
reality at the date of the performance tendered.29  
 
26 With reference to the facts of the case, the actions of Dresdner and CIMB in 
paying over the money and passing the promissory notes can only be explained on the 
basis that both parties (despite any protestations to the contrary) thought or acted as if 
there was some sort of legal relationship between them. Given that the assumed contract 
formed the basis for the parties’ actions and is the reason why any enrichment occurred at 
all, the putative governing law of the contract should have been held to be the applicable 
law of the unjust enrichment claim. 
 
C. The separability of the choice of law clause 
 
27 The court briefly made reference to the idea that a choice of law clause is 
separable from the other terms of the contract in the passage reproduced above.30 The 
idea of separability enables one to justify why a law stipulated in a choice of law clause 
could go on to govern the restitutionary consequences of contractual invalidity when the 
other contractual terms have been struck out.  
 
28 The concept of the separability of the choice of law clause does not wholly cohere 
with the court’s reasoning on whether there has been a “meeting of minds” between the 
parties. Under this strand of the court’s analysis, one examined whether the parties had 
reached a “meeting of minds” on the contract as a whole whereas if the idea of 
separability of the choice of law clause is to be fully embraced, one should examine if 
there has been a “meeting of minds” on the choice of law clause itself.  
 
29 The idea of the separability of the choice of law clause has more relevance to the 
court’s suggestion that one has to examine independently whether the vitiating factor 
directly impugns the choice of law clause. It is implicit that the court envisages a 
situation where the other terms of the contract may have fallen down, but the choice of 
law clause survives to govern the consequences of the failure of the contract. The court 
though provided little hint in its judgment as to whether the isolation of a choice of law 
clause in this manner is to be viewed as a legal or policy construct.  
 
                                                 
29 Baring Brothers v Cunninghame District Council [1997] CLC 108 at 126. However, it should be noted 
that even though Lord Penrose recognised the significance of the parties’ attempt to create a contract, he 
rejected the straightforward application of the putative proper law of the contract to govern the 
restitutionary claim in favour of a more flexible law of closest connection approach.  
30 In Part IV (B), para 24. 
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30 The answer to this is probably : both. One argument that could be made is that 
contracts do not exist in a legal vacuum. Important terms in a contract, such as 
“currency”, “payment” and “damages” only have meaning when referred to a legal 
system. As Lord Diplock put it : 
 
contracts … are mere pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless they 
were made by reference to some system of private law which defines the 
obligations assumed by the parties to the contract by their use of particular 
forms of words and prescribes the remedies enforceable .…31  
 
31 In this sense, a choice of law clause can be said to inhabit a higher jurisprudential 
plane compared to the other substantive terms of the contract and thus, legally speaking, 
it is separable from the contract. Alternatively, one could argue, as Briggs does, that a 
choice of law clause, along with any jurisdiction clause and arbitration agreement, forms 
part of the parties’ attempt to set up a dispute resolution mechanism.32 This mechanism 
must be separable from the performance obligations of the contract otherwise it would be 
of no utility. In addition, the pragmatic reasons set out earlier33 as to why the criticism of 
illogicality should not be a hurdle to giving effect to a choice of law clause contained in a 
void contract, ie that this protects party expectations, prevents inconsistent outcomes, 
minimizes characterization problems and points towards the law of closest connection to 
the unjust enrichment claim, provide compelling justification to warrant treating a choice 
of law clause as being separable from the substantive provisions in a contract as a matter 
of policy.34 
 
32 A related question is : what law determines whether the choice of law clause can 
be severed from the contract in which it is contained? Academic discussion on this issue 
favours the putative governing law of the contract determining whether the choice of law 
clause is separable from the contract and capable of surviving the invalidity of the 
contract.35 Since it is best to minimize the role of the alternative, the lex fori, submitting 
the question of a choice of law clause’s separability to the putative governing law of the 
contract seems to be a sensible solution. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
33 Where void contracts are concerned, logically intractable problems abound. In 
CIMB Bank Bhd v Dresdner Kleinwort Ltd, the Singapore Court of Appeal showed that it 
was possible to approach the issue of when a choice of law clause could be applied to the 
restitutionary consequences of voidness with a mixture of pragmatism and principle. The 
court did much to clarify and articulate the rules in this area but it is submitted that 
                                                 
31 Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50 at 65. 
32 Adrian Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law (OUP, 2008), esp Chapter 3. 
33 See Part IV (B). 
34 It should be noted that legal justifications stemming from drawing an analogy with arbitration and 
jurisdiction clauses (which are separable from the contract) are less persuasive given that the analogy is 
imperfect; arbitration and jurisdiction clauses are procedural in nature whereas choice of law clauses are 
substantive in nature. 
35 Harris, supra n 6, at 326. 
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arguably, it ultimately did not apply those same principles wholeheartedly to the case at 
hand. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
